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EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
TORTS AFTER BUTZ V. ECONOMOU
I wish the State of Society was so far improved, and the
science of Government advanced to such a degree of
perfection, as that the whole nation could in the peaceful course of law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued
by individual citizens.

Chief Justice Jay'
INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution is almost completely silent concerning damage remedies to be employed for implementation of its guarantees.2 Vindication of constitutional
rights damaged by a government executive officer has historically come about through either judicial implication or specific
legislation. The primary difficulty in developing such sanctions against a federal executive is identifying a defendant
within a hierarchical federal system against whom one can
bring a cause of action for violation of constitutionally defined
interests.
A basic doctrine of governmental responsibility in tort is
that the individual officer or employee is liable for injury arising out of his own negligence.3 Opportunities for such injury
continually expand in the wake of a growing federal bureaucracy with enhanced rule-making and rule-enforcing powers.'
Despite this expansion of powers, the tendency to confer immunity upon an officer, until recently, was growing. This oce 1980 by Philip L. Gregory, Jr.
1. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793), held that article III and the
Judiciary Act of 1789 granted jurisdiction for an action by South Carolina citizens to
recover on bonds which had been confiscated by the state of Georgia. The Chief Justice noted that permitting suit "enables each and every [citizen] to obtain justice,
without any danger of being overborne by the weight and number of their opponents." Id. at 478.
2. See Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 111.8-22 (1969).
3. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Brady
v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943).
4. See Power, New Wealth and New Harms-The Case for Broadened Governmental Liability, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 449, 453 (1969).
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curred without a concomitant growth of other remedies
through particular legislation or judicial creation of civil actions based on constitutionally defined interests.
In the past, courts considered whether the cause of action
6
necessarily involved conduct actionable either at common law
or through statute6 without looking to the Constitution; yet
conduct should be "actionable as a deprivation of constitutional rights where no force or violence has been utilized, and
there exists no orthodox counterpart of state common law or
statutory relief available."'7 The United States Supreme Court
has begun to embrace this latter viewpoint by fastening upon
the executive officer an obligation to pay damages for injurious constitutional deprivations. The most recent decision in
this area, Butz v. Economou,6 holds federal executive officials
are entitled only to qualified immunity in a suit for damages
arising from unconstitutional action.
The purpose of this comment is fourfold: first, it will refine a definition of constitutional tort as that concept has been
applied in recent decisions. Second, the comment will document judicial attacks on executive immunity with a focus on
liability for constitutional torts. Third, Butz v. Economou is
discussed as expanding the levels of immunity in constitutional claims against federal executive officials. Finally, suggestions will be offered to develop standards for deciding constitutional tort controversies.
5. The Supreme Court has looked to the common law in constructing immunities. See Imbler v. Patchmen, 424 U.S. 409, 417-19 (1976), and the cases there discussed; see generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common
Law, 19 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 64, 79-92 (1964).
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) authorizes courts to look to the common law of the states
where this is "necessary to furnish suitable remedies." In other cases, the interests
protected by a particular constitutional right may not also be protected by an analogous branch of the common law of torts. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5
(1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 250-51 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971); id. at 408-09
(Harlan, J., concurring).
6. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). But see Wyandotte Transp. Co.
v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-04 (1967). See generally Thayer, Public Wrong
and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914).
7. Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1972)(complaint against police
stated cause of action by alleging an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the eighth amendment). See Katz, The Jurisprudenceof Remedies: Constitutinal Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1968).
8. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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TORT RECOGNITION CRITERIA

Defining a Constitutional Tort
A tort requires that a plaintiff have a legally protected
right which, when invaded by the defendant, is compensable
by money damages.' The civil remedy for constitutionaltorts
is the direct claim by the victim of the official wrongdoing to
secure compensation for the denial of his constitutional
rights. The distinction is that the source of the legal duty
owed the plaintiff is the Constitution. °
Initially, it is important to differentiate between conduct
which is actionable in state courts as a tort, and that which is
actionable in federal courts as a constitutional injury sounding
in tort. In examining the invasion of constitutionally protected interests, there is an important premise: these rights
are constitutionally created, but subject to private vindication. "It thus appears that what is developing is a kind of
'constitutional tort.' It is not quite a private tort, yet it contains tort elements; it is not 'constitutional law,' but employs
a constitutional test."" In theory, these interests are akin to
the private rights protected by the law of torts, established
either by common law or statute. Yet, unlike the varying strictures of private tort law, there is a public policy of broad interpretation wh6re constitutional rights are to be protected.12
The essential and distinguishable feature, then, for this type
of tort action is the breach of some constitutionalduty or obligation owed the plaintiff.
Another feature distinguishing the two classes of tort is
the qualitative difference of the rights involved. Some common law and statutory torts, although actionable in a state
forum, do not rise to constitutional dimensions. The converse
is equally true. For example, allegations of a violation of a cit9. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 4 (4th ed. 1971).
10. See Comment, Sovereign Immunity-An Anathema to the "Constitutional
Tort", 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 543 (1972).
The ability of federal courts to provide remedies for governmental violations of constitutionally protected rights is essential to the existence and
continuance of those rights; this ability is perhaps the most important
element of due process in its most meaningful form.
Id. at 560.
11. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60,
Nw. U. L. REV. 277, 323-24 (1965).
12. See Valle v. Stangel, 176 F.2d 697, 702 (3d Cir. 1949).
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izen's first amendment protection against governmental restrictions on freedom of speech or a perpetration of the "ultimate form of constitutional injury . . . the taking of life
without due process," 3 contrast with an alleged impairment
to plaintiff's reputation by government officials through the
common law tort of defamation.14 The qualitative difference
of the rights involved is perhaps the main reason why the
courts have allowed the former two to plead their1 5case, while
foreclosing the latter through absolute immunity.
The court's role in redressing constitutional injuries
should be to determine the precise nature of the action and
the constitutional deprivation asserted. It must then ascertain
which of the named defendants are legally cognizable parties
to the proceeding. Finally, the court must determine the level
of immunity to be afforded the official(s). This structuring of
the constitutional tort claim should be the same for both state
and federal officials.
Legal Structure for Recognition of Constitutional Tort
Liability
One very important assumption underlies the constitutional tort cause of action; the public interest requires action
and decision making by executive officers for the protection of
the citizenry.' 6 Any resolution of the questions of liability and
immunity must, therefore, take into account the functions and
responsibilities of the defendants in their capacities as government officials. These officials should only be entitled to immunity for alleged constitutional deprivations if they act in good
faith and upon reasonable grounds, even if this restraint may
result in inaction by public officers charged with a considerable amount of responsibility and discretion.
The only defense afforded state executive officers for acts
performed in the course of official conduct has been the existence of reasonable grounds for a good-faith belief that the
13. Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Conduct: The
Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C. L. Rev. 548, 593 (1972).
14. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 695 (1976).
15. 403 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In Monroe, Justice Harlan emphasized that the relief afforded by state law would
"be far less than what Congress may have thought would be a fair reimbursement for
deprivation of a constitutional right." 365 U.S. at 196 n.5.
16. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974).
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action would not result in injury to a citizen's constitutional
rights. This qualified immunity is based on common law,
which has been incorporated by the courts in analyzing constitutional tort claims. 17
The eleventh amendment, prohibiting suits against one
state by citizens of another state, provides no shield for a
state official confronted by a constitutional tort claim. 18 The
rationale of the eleventh amendment prohibition is that the
state can neither act unconstitutionally nor authorize such
action.
The applicable principle is that where state officials, purporting to act under state authority, invade rights secured
by the Federal Constitution, they are subject to the process of the Federal Courts in order that the injured may
have appropriate relief.' 9
Thus it would appear that the eleventh amendment is
subordinate to the rights secured to citizens by other
provisons of the Constitution.
Federal courts also applied the above-mentioned common
law considerations to structure a cause of action for civil liability against federal officers for constitutional deprivations.
That is, while the injured party is granted a cause of action
under the general federal question jurisdiction, 2° the officer
may prove in defense both his subjective good-faith belief that
his conduct was lawful and the objective reasonableness of
this belief under the circumstances. Thus, federal officials receive no greater zone of protection from constitutional claims
than their counterparts in state government.
Section 1983. The principal federal statute authorizing a
damage remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights is sec17. As the Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 124 (1908) stated:
The attempt of a state officer to enforce an unconstitutional statute is a
proceeding without authority of, and does not affect, the state in its sovereign or governmental capacity, and is an illegal act and the officer is
stripped of his official character and is subjected in his person to the
consequence of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to its officer immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority
of the United States.
18. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See text accompanying notes 27-31
infra.
19. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 393 (1932).
20. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.21 The legislative history of section 198322 demonstrates that it was intended to
create "a species of tort liability" in favor of persons deprived
of "rights, privileges, or immunities" secured to them by the
Constitution."3 The terms of section 1983 require proof of two
elements for recovery: first, that the defendant deprived
plaintiff of a right secured by the "Constitution and laws" of
the United States; and second, that the defendant deprived
Once there
him of this right "under color of any law . . ."
is a recognition of the right sought to be vindicated, the proof
of the section 1983 deprivation "should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for
the natural consequences of his acts .... "2,5 This standard
has been construed to include negligent or reckless abuse of
official position. 8
Due to section 1983's tort standard of constitutional deprivation, the status of state officials qua defendants had to be
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)(originally enacted as Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, §
1, 17 Stat. 13) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
22. Section 1983 originated as a legislative response to post-Civil War "outrages" occuring in Southern States because local law enforcement agencies were either unable or unwilling to enforce the state laws against whites who were accused of
depriving blacks of their political rights. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 16667, 428 app. (1871); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 172-83; Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 238-42 (1972).
23. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
24. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
25. 365 U.S. at 187.
26. As the court stated in Pritchard v. Perry, 508 F.2d 423, 425 (4th Cir. 1975):
There is no warrant for a separation of constitutional rights into
redressable rights and nonredressable rights, of major and minor unconstitutional deprivation, and section 1983 makes no such distinction and
authorizes no such separation. By its very terms it applies indiscriminately to a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws.
See McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir. 1972) (clerk of court liable for negligently impeding filing petition for postconviction relief); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781,
791-92 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969) (sheriff liable for keeping
plaintiff imprisoned due to negligent failure to learn of dismissal of charges). See also
Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 16-25
(1974).
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reevaluated in light of the traditional common law defenses.
These defenses were first considered in Pierson v. Ray.2 7 In an

action against police officers, the Pierson Court held that
common law privileges and defenses to actions for false arrest
were included in the statute.2 8 Noting that at common law a
policeman was not personally liable for arrests made in good
faith and with probable cause, the Court denied liability,
"even though the arrest in fact was unconstitutional.

' 29

Thus, the defense initially incorporated into section 1983
actions for constitutional torts contained subjective and objective elements. The defendant was required to prove both that
he acted in good faith and that his belief in the legality of his
actions was reasonable.30 The difficulty with this incorporation of common law was that it frustrated a major purpose of
section 1983, which was to overcome the deficiencies and
vagueness of relief from constitutional violations available to
plaintiff under state law." Application of state laws to a federal statute designed to alleviate the inadequacies of state law
was much different from the mere reference to the background of tort liability. Clearly, a standard had to be found
for constitutional tort actions that would be based on constitutional policies applicable to state officials at all levels of
government.
The question was resolved by basing the official's defense
both upon the functions and responsibilities of the office and
27. 386 U.S. 547 (1966). Plaintiffs had been arrested by state police for breach
of peace under a state "segregated facilities" statute. After their convictions were
overturned and the statute later declared unconstitutional (see Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965)), they sued the trial judge and the arresting officers under
section 1983 for false arrest. Since the arrest and convictions were unconstitutional,
the only legal issue presented was whether the officials were protected by some level
of immunity. 386 U.S. at 550. The judge was found to be absolutely immune, since he
was acting within his judicial jurisdiction. Id. at 553-55.
28. 386 U.S. at 550.
29. Id. at 557.
30. Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police Deprivationsof Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991, 1004-05 (1975).
Probable cause is traditionally defined in terms of the reasonableness of the belief of the arresting officer. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). An inquiry
into the officer's belief of the reasonableness of his action cannot be made without
reference to the facts that prompted the officer to act.
31. See text accompanying note 10 supra. Qualls v. Parish, 534 F.2d 690, 694
(6th Cir. 1976) (officer permitted to shoot at auto if he relied on "settled law of his
state").
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the purposes of section 1983."2 The court in Scheuer v.
Rhodes discussed the former consideration by suggesting that
"since the options which a chief executive must consider are
broader than lower executive officers . . . his range of discretion must be comparably broad. ' 33 By basing the level of immunity in part on the official's hierarchical position in government, the court made available a qualified immunity
"dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities
of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to
be based. '3 4 This standard allows a court to consider many
factors other than discretion to determine if the official acted
reasonably, including the specific matters involved in the official's decision, the extent to which the threat of liability
would unduly inhibit the decision-making process, the seriousness of the constitutional violation, and the availability of
reasonable alternatives to the official at the time he made his
decision. These factors should be weighed against the importance of compensating the victim and deterring future constitutional violations. 35
Thus, the qualified immunity of a police officer in Pierson
and that of a high level official in Scheuer differ to the extent
that there are clearer legal standards governing the reasonableness of an arrest than there are governing the reasonableness of controlling civil disorder. Also, while a policeman is
not held to the same degree of legal knowledge as a governor,
he does not exercise as much discretion. Since the standard
for judicial inquiry remains the same in each case, the scope
of the official's discretion and responsibility in great part determines the standards under which his conduct is evaluated.
An important factor that led to much post-Scheuer con32. 416 U.S. at 243. This case arose out of the Kent State University tragedy.
Various Ohio state officials, ranging from the governor to enlisted members of the
National Guard, were sued under section 1983 for wrongful deaths of plaintiffs decedents. The complaint alleged suppression of a civil disturbance in an unconstitutional
manner.
33. Id. at 247.
34. Id.
One should note that neither the statutory language of section 1983 nor its legislative history refer to any motive or state of mind requirement as a defense to liability. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 365-66, 385, 390 app. (1871). See Comment,
The Evolution of the State of Mind Requirement of Section 1983, 47 TUL. L. REV.
870 (1973).
35. See text accompanying notes 139-50 infra.
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fusion3 6 was the subjective criterion, good faith. Wood v.
Strickland3 7 resolved this confusion by structuring a test including both a subjective good-faith belief in the constitutionality of his official action and an objective basis for his belief
in that good faith. Wood overcomes some of the difficulties
presented by the Pierson common law defense in that the reasonableness of an executive's belief is measured in light of the
"clearly established constitutional rights" of the aggrieved
person.3 Ignorance of the law is no longer controlling when
objective circumstances indicate that the official knew or
should have known that constitutional rights were being
violated.
After Wood, the plaintiff's new difficulty is the burden of
proving the existence of established constitutional law upon
which the alleged right exists. To satisfy section 1983, one
may have to prove: 1) that the defendant knew or should reasonably have known of the constitutional right, 2) reasonable
grounds for believing the act or decision would result in an
unconstitutional deprivation, 3) violation of a constitutional
right under color of state law, and 4) damage proximately
caused. Even if the plaintiff proves these elements, a qualified
immunity may still be. affirmitively established by the
defendant.3 9
Although Pierson to some extent clarified the parameters
of liability for law enforcement officials, Scheuer and Wood
articulated that the immunity extended to executive officials
as a defense on the merits involves proof of state of mind.4 0
36. As to this confusion, see Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (1st Cir.
1973); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974). Puckett v. Mobile City Comm'n, 380 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
37. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Wood held that students who had summarily been expelled from school for "spiking the punch" at a dance could maintain an action for
damages against school board members for violation of their rights to procedural due
process.
38. 420 U.S. at 317-18. It is interesting to note that the Wood Court applied the
requirements of Pierson and Scheuer to a case in which the alleged constitutional
violation did not involve a direct physical invasion of an individual's person, but
rather the deprivation of an intangible right to procedural due process.
39. One must remember that even when the plaintiff is a victim of a constitutional tort, the doctrine of immunity by its very nature implies that the defendant
can be free from liability. See Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1975).
40. 416 U.S. at 247-48. A number of lower courts purporting to apply the
Scheuer holding have overlooked the "reasonable grounds" requirement, citing either
Scheuer or Woods as establishing merely a good faith defense. Mims v. Bd. of Educ.,
523 F.2d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 1975); Laverne v. Corning, 522 F.2d 1144, 1150 (2d Cir.
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Because the duty imposed was set out by the Constitution,
the issue became whether federal executive officials would be
held to the standard developed under section 1983. Do constitutional tort actions only apply to civil suits against state officials? When the same violations are committed by federal offi4
cials, does a court look to section 1983 for a remedy? ' The
next section provides answers to these questions by analyzing
the development of federal constitutional tort liability.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics."2 When federal agents are defendants in actions for constitutional deprivations, judicial conviction that
these agents should be governed by the same rules which federal courts have previously applied to state officials has been a
s
persuasive force in forming the scope of constitutional torts.'
Before recognizing damage remedies, federal courts had long
recognized that activities violating the Constitition are
wrongs, 4 4 yet these same courts rarely recognized that result45
ing harms could be compensated by monetary damages. This
latter determination was based both on the policy of preserving effective government by negating the threat of civil liabil6
ity and the doctrine of separation of powers.'
If an officer is acting unconstitutionally he is not acting
within his federal authority and has therefore lost any of his
sovereign-employer's immunity from suit. Actions against a
federal official may then have their origin in the Constitution. 47 Since the court has equitable power over an official pre1975).
41. Roots v. Calahan, 475 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1973); Savage v. United States, 450
F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1043 (1972).
42. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
43. States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1157 (4th Cir. 1974).
This suit was brought by a ship's charterer against the Treasury Secretary and the
Customs Service. The court stated: "[I]t would be incongruous indeed if the federal
government were left completely unrestrained under identical wording of the Fifth
Amendment following the seizure of goods by customs officers." Id. at 1154.
44. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
45. However, where Congress had through specific legislation authorized money
damages for constitutional violations, they were awarded. See West v. Cabell, 153
U.S. 78 (1894); Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U.S. 17 (1884). See also Dellinger, Of Rights
and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
46. See text accompanying notes 69-73 infra for a discussion of the doctrines of
sovereign immunity and separation of powers.
47. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). Here the Court sustained an
ejectment action against federal officials in possession of the Arlington estate of Robert E. Lee. Even though the government had record title due to foreclosing on an
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paring to act unconstitutionally,"8 it should follow that the
court has power over him when he has so acted. Under the
general federal question jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C.
section 1331(a),"9 the Court in Bell v. Hood50 held that federal
courts had jurisdiction over one who brought suit against individual federal agents who had allegedly violated his fourth
amendment rights. Yet, until 1971, the question remained unanswered as to whether a nonstatutory federal damage remedy would lie to redress a constitutionally defined interest
that was injured in tort.
In 1971, the Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics5 1 held that a violation
alleged tax lien, the Court made it clear that the case involved enforcing the fifth
amendment prohibition of taking without just compensation as applicable "both to
the executive and legislative" branches. Id. at 220. This enforcement was compared to
the protection of constitutional liberty of the person by writ of habeus corpus. Id. at
218.
See, e.g., Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609
(1963).
A different approach to the poetics of these decisions is offered by Roady, Lee,
Land, Larson, and Malone-Sovereign Immunity Revisited, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1062
(1965).
48. Historically, judicial remedies against federal officers in federal courts were
equitable in nature. See, e.g., Rickert Rice Mills, Inc. v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110
(1936).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States except that no such sum or value shall
be required in any such action brought against the United States, any
agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.
In most litigation in which plaintiff will want to state a cause of action directly
under the Constitution, the matter at issue will not easily lend itself to traditional
concepts of monetary valuation. For example, what is the monetary value of a particular constitutional right such as that to a speedy trial, freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure, or freedom of assembly?
50. 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946). On remand, the district court determined that
the complaint did not state a federal claim for relief. It reasoned that only governmental activity gives rise to a constitutional violation; and, since federal officers violating the Constitution are acting beyond the scope of their authority, their acts are
not the acts of the government and therefore cannot be unconstitutional. Bell v.
Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
See, e.g., United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 971 (1965); Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1957); Koch v. Zuiback, 194
F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd 316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963); Garfield v. Palvieri, 193
F. Supp. 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 290 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 827 (1961).
51. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Federal agents had ransacked Bivens' apartment dur-
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of the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures by federal officers is an actionable federal offense" cognizable in federal courts despite the absence
of a specifically created statutory cause of action.5 8 Prior to
Bivens, such damage claims had to be adjudicated in state
court, utilizing state tort law. Since Bivens was decided in
terms of "a federally protected interest,"' it created a judicial
forum to redress any constitutional tort committed by federal
executive officials, not just fourth amendment violations. 5
The Bivens-type action could thereupon be viewed as creating
a new species of federal tort claims: one where the necessary
legal duty is imposed by the Constitution and the violation of
this duty permits a cause of action for damages.
The Court employed three strong rationales to justify its
departure from pre-Bivens case law. First, one acting in the
name of the federal government has the potential ability to
bring about substantially greater harm than the ordinary citizen.5 6 Second, the fourth amendment serves as an "independent limitation upon the exercise of federal power.

'5 7

Finally,

state laws that coincidentially protect fourth amendment
rights may operate in a manner hostile to those constitutional
ing a warrentless search, arrested him without probable cause, subjected him to an
unnecessarily humiliating personal search, detained him unlawfully, and then re-

leased him without filing charges.
52. The Court used the phrase "under color of his authority." Id. at 389. The
opinion thus adhered to the traditional, concept, derived from the section 1983 cases,
that an agent of the government who acts unconstitutionally cannot be within the
scope of his authority, since the government, cannot authorize unconstitutional acts.
See, e.g., Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 9-18 (1891); In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443, 500-02 (1887). See generally Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the
United States and its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 837 (1957).
53. The Court in Bivens stated: "For we have here no... congressional declaration that persons injured . . . may not recover money damages from the agents."
403 U.S. at 397. See Dellinger, supra note 45. The propriety of a damage remedy
would depend upon whether the plaintiff was in the position of one protected by the
substantive law and whether there were other effective means of redress. Id. at 1551.
54. 403 U.S. at 400.
55. The Court had previously created the powerful remedy of the exclusionary
rule to prevent the use in a criminal trial of evidence gained in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
As a direct rather than indirect sanction, a damage remedy could be effective
where the exclusionary rule is either inapplicable or ineffective. Damages would not
only provide a supplement, but possibily a substitute for the rule.
56. 403 U.S. at 392.
57. Id. at 392-94.
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rights.5 8
As damage awards would further the intent of the Constitution,5 9 it was not required that the remedy structured be
calculated to serve as a deterrent against future constitutional
violations.6a In this regard, the Court turned to J. I. Case v.
Borak,6 1 a decision indicating a judicial propensity to grant
damages despite the absence of an authorizing statute. 2 This
remedial power, once asserted, has allowed federal district
courts to award monetary damages against the responsible
federal official.
It is important to note that Bivens did not discuss the
level of immunity available to federal officials. The case was
remanded for that determination."' The courts of appeal considering this question have held that the agents were not ab58. Id. at 394. An action for trespass, for example, normally fails if the officer
can prove that he demanded entry and received it, even though by federal standards
he clearly violated the individual's constitutional rights. Id. But see Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955).
59. 403 U.S. at 395-96. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, discussed the
Court's power to recognize a tort from the Constitution. Id. at 402-06. Two members
of the Court were of the opinion that the Court's recognition of a tort from the Constitution was an encroachment upon the legislative powers of Congress and thus an
unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at
428 (Black, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 395-96. The Court stated:
[I1t's . . . well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.
Id. at 396 (quoting from Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684).
The Court also cited Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1968). Katz argues
that the Constitution created interests in liberty cognizable in law in the same manner as did the Magna Carta in England. Just as the Magna Carta became part of the
common law, he asserts that the Constitution transformed a political ethic into a
recognized legal form. Tracing the growth of remedies in England to protect these
interests in liberty, Katz argues that the same considerations "directly refutes the
notion that laws that place limits on governmental activity are somehow different
from private law." Id. at 9-10.
61. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Borak permitted a damage recovery to a shareholder
claiming violations of the proxy requirements of section 14(a) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.
62. See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV. 285 (1963).
63. On remand, the appellate court in Bivens held that the officers were acting
within the scope of their duties while making the arrest, in that the officials were
fulfilling their tasks as narcotics agents. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456
F.2d 1339, 1343 (2d Cir. 1972). Nevertheless, the court found the officers only had a
qualified defense, dependent upon their good faith and reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and search. Id. at 1348.
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solutely immune and that the public interest would be protected if these agents were granted only a qualified
immunity."
The apparent implication of Bell and Bivens is that the
recognition of claims based directly on the Constitution under
general federal question jurisdiction enables the federal court
to utilize the judicial power to draft appropriate remedies.
The source of this power is to be found, if at all, in article III
of the Constitution: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases . . . arising under this Constitution . . . ."" An action
involving the violation of constitutional rights that is based
directly on a constitutional provision is one that "[arises]
under the Constitution."6
In considering whether a damage remedy would be appropriate in a particular situation, courts have emphasized the
availability of similar relief against state officials. 7 The effect
of the Bivens decision was to make the prescribed conduct of
federal officers conform to the constitutional standard applicable to state officers under section 1983. The analogy is reasonable because the Bill of Rights imposes many of the same
constraints on federal agents that the fourteenth amendment,
through incorporation, exerts on state officers. This ensures
that the victim of unconstitutional conduct has a federal damage remedy available regardless of whether the perpetrator
was a federal or state officer.68 Once jurisdiction is established,
the issues become whether the plaintiff's claim states a cause
of action under the Constitution and whether a defendant can
avoid the claim by asserting some level of immunity.
64. E.g., GM Leasing Corp. v. United States, 560 F.2d 1011 (10th Cir. 1977);
Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976); Black v. United States, 534 F.2d
524 (2d Cir. 1976); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3rd Cir. 1975); Mark v. Groff,
521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975).
65.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See Dellinger, supra note 45, at 1541.

66.

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 681-82.

67.

See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 500-01.

68. It is possible to argue that the fourth amendment's limitations on the exercise of federal, authority are the result of a demand for uniformity in federal law.
Here the basis of the personal rights themselves remain part of the common law. This
common law is necessarily state law by the terms of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938). See, Note, The Truly Constitutional Tort, 33 U. PiTT. L. REV. 271, 278
(1971).
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RESTRAINTS ON THE IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY

Sovereign and Executive Immunity
A majority of suits against the federal government were
formerly foreclosed due to the "jurisdictional" concept" of
sovereign immunity that precluded suit against the United
States without demonstrated legislative consent.70 The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an exception to the fundamental concept of tort law that liability follows tortious conduct
and that individuals and corporations are responsible for the
acts of their employees acting in the course of their employment. The most fundamental objection to the sovereign immunity doctrine is that it obfuscates the real issues: whether
particular governmental activity should be subject to judicial
review, and, if so, what form of relief is appropriate.
There is no constitutional justification for sovereign immunity; 71 it owes its continued existence to a perceived need
69. A discussion in Comment, Immunity of Government Officers: Effects of the
Larson Case, 8 STAN. L. REV. 683, 686 (1956), very ably points out that:
[Bloth the plaintiff's cause of action and his ability to negate the defense of sovereign immunity depended upon his ability to show action in
excess of authority. The courts therefore made a preliminary determination of "jurisdiction" on the pleadings. Unless the actions alleged could
not be said to be in excess of the statutory authority pleaded by the
defendants, the court admitted jurisdiction and proceeded to a finding
on the merits. Thus there was really no jurisdictional question of sovereign immunity separate from the question on the merits. The merits depended upon whether the defendant had departed from the authority
found to be his under a proper construction of the statute alleged to
have been violated. (emphasis in original).
70. In the absence of an act of Congress, an officer of the federal government
cannot waive the government's immunity from suit. Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S.
255, 270 (1896). Case v. Terrell, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 199 (1871), establishes the obligation of an appellate court on its own motion to raise the issue of the immunity of the
United States, even though the immunity objection is not asserted by government
lawyers.
A federal statute may limit the consent of the federal government to suits
brought against it in federal courts. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 388
(1939). For the power of a state to prescribe the terms of its consent, see Beers v.
Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857).
As to the continued viability of sovereign immunity, see generally Note, Suits
Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L.
REV. 1060 (1946), which proposes that there is only one policy basis for the doctrine
today: "subjection of the federal government to private damage suits 'might constitute a serious interference with the performance of [its] its functions and with [its]
control over [its] respective instrumentalities, funds, and property.' " Id. at 1061 (citation omitted).
71. Edwin M. Borchard, in the first of several articles on government liability in
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for judicial self-restraint in cases of potentially serious interference with the administration of government.7 2 Ithas been
stated that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is such a
strong impediment to suits against the government that it can
even bar suits that are based on violations of constitutional
rights. 3
Application of an automatic sovereign immunity standard
for federal officials might be explained by the federal judiciary's reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of a coequal branch of government. Yet, recent decisions have highlighted the weakness of the argument, even though these cases
have arisen in a context somewhat different from that of a
civil damage claim. In United States v. Nixon, 4 the Court
held that "the doctrine of separation of powers . . .without
more, [cannot] sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. '75 If the President cannot successfully invoke the
doctrine to avoid producing confidential communications, it is
difficult to imagine how separation of powers can be used to
protect sub-cabinet rank officials from constitutional torts.
7
Also, it has been unquestioned since Marbury v. Madison
that even cabinet members are not completely immune from
suit.
Thus, while the United States enjoys sovereign immunity,
tort, observed that
[n]othing seems more clear than that this immunity of the King from
the jurisdiction of the King's courts was purely personal. How it came to
be applied in the United States of America, where the prerogative is
unknown, is one of the mysteries of legal evolution.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924). See also L. JAFFEE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

353-75 (1965); Saferstein, Nonreview-

ability; A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion", 82
REV.

HARV.

L.

367 (1968).

72. Byse, Proposed Reforms In Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensible Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479, 1484
(1962).
73. See Hill, supra note 2, at 1112. Apparently, the theoretical justification for
this position is that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was well recognized and regularly used at the time the Constitution was adopted. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934). On the other hand, it has been argued that
Congress does not have the power to limit jurisdiction where to do so would prevent
the vindication of a constitutional right. See Dellinger, supra note 45, at 1556-57.
74. 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (denied the President the claim of executive privilege in
refusing the Special Prosecutor's attempt to subpoena documents and tapes).
75. Id. at 706.
76. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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its officers do not. They are answerable, as private individuals,
for wrongs committed in the course of their official work, just
as a private agent is answerable for a wrong committed by
him on behalf of or at the command of his principle." The
sovereign immunity doctrine comes into play when the court
regards the suit, though against the official in name, as, in reality, against the United States. 8
Yet a corresponding executive immunity is often afforded
the government official that may foreclose any relief.L7 9 The
crucial question becomes: In determining the reasonableness
of an executive officer's good faith, should a member of the
judiciary inquire into the reasonableness of the officer's action? The reasonableness of his action may, in some cases, be
determinative of the litigation's outcome.8 0 This will become
an even more important consideration as more officials are exposed to personal liability for constitutional torts.
Immunity originally only protected those officials executing federal statutory duties from criminal or civil actions
based on state law; s ' the judicially created doctrine of executive immunity is derived from the absolute immunity afforded
77. A public official who acts under an unconstitutional statute or outside his
authority is personally subject to the consequences of his conduct. Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. at 159-60; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 843,
868 (1824).
As the Court stated in Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 693 (1949):
The mere allegation that the officer, acting officially, wrongfully holds
property to which the plaintiff has title does not meet that requirement.
True, it establishes a wrong to the plaintiff. But it does not establish
that the officer, in committing that wrong, is not exercising the powers
delegated to him by the sovereign. If he is exercising such powers, the
action is the sovereign's ....
78. Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against Officers for Relief Other Than
Damages, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 3, 9 (1954).
79. Democracy by its very definition implies responsibility. See generally Laski,
The Responsibility of the State in England, 32 HARv. L. REV. 447 (1919). In this day
of increasing power wielded by governmental officials, absolute immunity for nonjudicial, nonlegislative officials is outmoded and even dangerous. See generally Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209,
215-18 (1963); James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U.
Cm. L. REV. 610 (1955); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN.
L. REV. 263 (1937).
80. Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MICH. L. REV. 201, 207-12
(1956); Jaffe, supra note 79, at 216-17.
81. See Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877) (wrongful seizure of alcohol off Indian land); Little v. Bareme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804)(commander of American
warship liable in trespass for wrongfully seizing Danish cargo).
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judges for acts done in the exercise of their judicial jurisdiction."2 The extention of executive immunity from common law
torts was based on two policy considerations." First, the injustice of imposing liability on officers legally required to exercise discretion; and second, concern that making executive officials susceptible to personal liability under such
circumstances would result in less than "fearless administration" of their responsibilities 84-that unfounded litigation
would harass the employees and result in a deflection of energy away from the employee's public duties."
Another avenue for analogizing executive immunity to judicial immunity has been the characterization of legally imposed duties as quasi-judicial. 5 Similarly, the common law
82. The absolute immunity afforded judicial officers was established early at
common law. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns 282 (N.Y. 1810). The Supreme Court in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871), acknowledged the immunity of the judiciary to be a general principle of the highest importance. The judicial officer is to be
"free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences
to himself." Id. at 347. A judge will be subject to liability only when he has acted in
the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 351.
In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), the Court reaffirmed Bradley's delineation of judicial immunity. The Court in Sparkman held that a judge, in approving a sterilization petition for tubal ligation on a minor, was immune from damages
liability under section 1983 even if his approval of the petition was in error.
83. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896). In Spalding the Court sustained
a demurrer to a complaint for malicious defamation against the Postmaster General.
The decision found the immunity question to be whether an executive official could
be held personally liable for an act "not unauthorized by law, nor beyond the scope of
his official duties." Id. at 493. The activity producing the defamation was held to be
within the scope of the Postmaster's official duties and that the motives of the defendant were immaterial. Id. at 499.
For an analysis of whether the analogy is justified, see Handler & Klein, The
Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Officials,
74 HARV. L. REV. 44, 53-64 (1960).
84. 161 U.S. at 495-98. This same rationale was advanced by Judge Learned
Hand in denying a plaintiff a forum:
[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden
of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Greorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950)(Justice Department officials should be absolutely immune from both common
law and constitutional tort causes of action for false imprisonment).
For a survey of post-Spalding lower court decisions, see Becht, The Absolute
Privilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1127, 1137-43 (1962).
85. As it pertains to governmental immunity, the term "quasi-judicial" initially
was synonymous with "discretionary" and thus indicative of conduct on which no
cause of action could be maintained. See 2 1. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 29.10, at 1638-39 (1956). Subsequently, the term referred to those officers
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absolute immunity of prosecutors from liability for malicious
prosecution is based on considerations like those justifying absolute immunity for the judiciary.8 6 Yet the shield of absolute
immunity is specifically limited to the prosecutor's quasi-judicial role as advocate.87 This leaves open the question of immunity for prosecutors acting in executive roles as administrators
or investigators 8 where the inhibitory effects of partial immunity might not be found as harmful.
A state prosecuting attorney is immune from a section
1983 suit alleging the deprivation of constitutional rights.8 9
This is so in light of the concern on the part of the courts that
a qualified immunity standard for prosecutors might jeopardize the integrity of the judicial process itself.90 For example, a
prosecutor's fear of liability might discourage him from using
a witnesses whose credibility was in doubt, thereby depriving
the jury of potentially relevant evidence. Also, judicial review
of criminal convictions might be affected by linking the possibility that a ruling favoring the convicted would result in a
suit against the prosecutor.
Expansion of absolute immunity represents a deviation
from the balancing approach utilized in the section 1983
cases. While these cases are distinguishable due to the nature
of the official function involved, they form a counterpoint to
the trend of holding public officials accountable for the infringement of basic constitutional rights.91 Immunity should
be read against the background of tort law. When a prosecuwhose duties aligned them more closely with the judicial process than with the executive branch.
86. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 421-24. The Court addressed whether a
state prosecuting attorney is immune from a section 1983 suit alleging the deprivation
of constitutional rights. The Court recognized the hybrid nature of the prosecutor's
office by distinguishing his executive roles of investigator and administrator from his
quasi-judicial role as advocate. Id. at 430-31. The Court held that a prosecuting attorney "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case" is absolutely immune from liability under section 1983. Id. at 431.
87. Id. at 430-31.
88. See text accompanying notes 131-34 infra.
89. 424 U.S. at 431. See note 86 supra.
90. See Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalitiesfor Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 956 n.171 (1976) (noting that Imbler was bottomed on
broad policy considerations rather than any notions that state immunity was applicable to its agents).
91. See, e.g., Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 1976)(Lumbard, J.,
concurring).
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92
tor purposefully solicits and uses perjured testimony, with-

holds exculpatory evidence, or otherwise misuses his office,
any shield from a damage remedy can lead to unconstitutional
results. 3 As even Wood's reasonable school board member is
held to possessing a pool of knowledge that includes an elementary awareness of the law, 94 certainly a prosecutor should
be held to that same standard in light of the nature of his
responsibilities and knowledge of constitutional principles.
"Due Care" and "Discretionary"Immunity
Until 1946, most private greivances against the federal
government outside the contractual area were redressed-if at
all-only by the passage of private bills through Congress. 5 In
1946, the United States broadened its own liability considerably by passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act 96 that permitted recovery against the government for the negligent acts of
its employees "to the same extent as a private individual."9
Courts often ignore the compensatory purpose of the Act and
instead apply, often with little justification, the defenses of
"due care" and "discretionary" immunity:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee
of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution
of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government, whether -or not the
discretion involved be abused."
Because negligent torts by definition do not involve the exer92. See Tate v. Grose, 412 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (Imbler controlling
even though perjured testimony was both solicited and used).
93. See Duba v. McIntyre, 501 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
975 (1976)(city attorney detained plaintiff in jail in order to sell his entire stock of
hogs to satisfy a $55 misdemeanor fine).
94. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
95. See generally Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal
Government, 9 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 311 (1942); Note, Tort Claims Against the
United States, 30 GEO. L.J. 462 (1942).
96. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)(originally enacted as Act of
Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842). For a discussion of the Act's enactment, see 1 L.
JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE & JUDICIAL REMEDIES § 60
(1979).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1975).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1975)(emphasis added).
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cise of "due care," there have been few cases interpreting that
clause.9 e
Unlike the "due care" defense, the "discretionary function" clause has been extensively litigated 0 ° and analyzed. 10 1
The exception is intended to keep vital government operations from being obstructed and to protect the executive
branch from too close a scrutiny of policy decisions. As the
Eighth Circuit once observed in defense of the doctrine:
The Congress had a sound basis for the use of the words
in the Exceptions of the Act and used them in recognition
of the separation of powers .. and the considerations of
public policy which have moved the courts to refuse to
interfere with the actions of officials at all levels of the
executive branch who, acting within the scope of their authority, were required to exercise discretion of
10 2
judgment.

While relying on the separation of powers doctrine is proper
when it seeks merely to maintain essential flexibility of executive decision making free from tort liability for every error in
judgment, no comparable freedom should exist for the government to plan or approve deliberate torts or attacks on private
freedoms.
In Barr v. Matteo,10 3 the plurality opinion delineated the
test to be applied in deciding whether a federal official is im99. In Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956), Navajo families sued the
federal government to recover damages for the destruction of their horses. Apparently, federal agents, who wished the Navajos to leave their homesites, had used an
"abandoned horse" statute to round up and destroy the animals. Id. at 175-76. In
analyzing the section 2680(a) exclusions, the Court stated:
The first portion of section (a) cannot apply here, since the government
agents were not exercising due care in their enforcement of the federal
law. "Due care" implies at least some minimal concern for the rights of
others. Here, the agents proceeded with complete disregard for the
property rights of the petitioners.
Id. at 178.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955) (per
curiam); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
101. See, e.g., James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary
Function" Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L.
REV. 184 (1957); Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Acts: A Proposed Construction of
the DiscretionaryFunction Exception, 31 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1956); Reynolds, Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81
(1968).
102. Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816, 818 (1950).
103. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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mune. That opinion first focused on an examination of the relation between the act complained of and matters within the
realm of the official's responsibility, rather than his title or
place in the federal hierarchy. Then, if the official's discretionary acts are "within the outer perimeter of [his] line of duty,"
the doctrine of executive immunity must be applied despite
an allegation of malice.10 Thus, the focus is on the decisional
process. The principle of executive immunity as enunciated in
Spalding v. Vilas10 5 to shield heads of executive departments
was extended by Barr to include officers of lower rank in the
executive hierarchy. Regardless of motive, absolute immunity
from liability for damages from defamation and kindred torts
was granted to employees exercising discretion, if these discretionary acts were related to matters committed by law to the
official's control or supervision.
Because of this discretionary immunity, Barr represents
an important point in the development of liability. In the aftermath of Barr, the Court considered executive liability
under the section 1983 cases.' 0 6 In these later decisions, the
Court's test balanced the need for effective governmental
functioning against the protection of the litigant's constitutional interests. Implementation of this balancing test required the Court to look at the circumstances of each case in
order to determine whether absolute immunity would increase
the official's ability to act without undue constraint as to justify the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.
As the opinions in Bivens, Barr, and the section 1983
cases demonstrate, two possible approaches to the law of executive liability for constitutional torts have developed. The
first approach grants absolute immunity if the acts performed
are discretionary and within the scope of the executive's duty.
The second approach requires the performance not only of
discretionary acts, but includes both a good faith-reasonable
grounds basis for the action and a balancing of the litigant's
constitutional interest against the government's interest in
functioning effectively through its officers. It is against this
immunity/liability dichotomy that Butz v. Economou was
decided.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 575.
161 U.S. 483 (1896). See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
See text accompanying notes 21-41 supra.
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STRUCTURING FEDERAL EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY

The decision in Butz v. Economou 0 7 answered the immunity question left unresolved by Bivens. °5 The direction offered by the Court was that federal executive immunity
should "reconcile the plaintiff's right to compensation with
the need to protect the decisionmaking process of an executive department."' 10 9 In pointing out that federal officials "enjoy no greater zone of protection" for constitutional torts than
state officers,' the Court held certain federal officers to the
same qualified "good faith-reasonable grounds" immunity advanced in the section 1983 cases.
Because this qualified immunity turns on a quantum of
discretion and responsibility, the Court held that some administrative officials, particularly those performing adjudicatory functions, would be absolutely immune from suit. This
class of officials included executive personnel performing
quasi-judicial functions, advocates responsible for the decision
to prosecute, and agency attorneys presenting evidence during
1 '
a proceeding.
The Butz decision arose when Earl Butz, then-Secretary
of Agriculture, issued an administrative complaint alleging
that Arthur N. Economou and his commodity trading company had failed to maintain the minimum capital balance required by the Commodity Exchange Act." 2 After a hearing
before an Agriculture Department examiner, a recommendation was issued that Economou's registration be revoked." 3 In
response, Economou sought injunctive relief and damages
against members of the Department of Agriculture, including
the Secretary, the Chief Hearing Officer, and prosecuting
counsel. The complaint alleged that these individuals had maliciously instituted the above proceedings to retaliate against
Economou's outspoken criticism of the Department's regula107. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
108. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
109. 438 U.S. at 503.
110. Id. at 501.
111. Id. at 508, 515-17.
112. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1979).
113. Because the agency had initiated its proceeding without first issuing a required warning letter, the court of appeals set aside the enforcement order as erroneous. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974)(per
curiam).
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tion of commodity trading.11 4 Economou asserted that the officers had "discouraged and chilled a campaign of criticism directed against them, and thereby deprived [Economou] of his
rights to free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution."' 1 5
The district court, concluding that the alleged conduct
was within the officials' scope of authority " 6 and involved the
exercise of discretion, dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the Department,
but reversed as to the individual defendants." 7 The court of
appeals reasoned that the officers were protected by the defense of good faith and reasonable grounds as advanced in
Bivens and the section 1983 cases.
The Supreme Court's decision in Butz structured two
levels of constitutional tort immunity for executive officials.
At the first level, officials, regardless of their rank or scope of
responsibilities, are entitled to only a qualified "good faithreasonable grounds" immunity. The second level affords absolute immunity to those officials performing quasi-adjudicatory
functions within a federal agency.
Qualified "Good Faith/ReasonableGrounds" Immunity
In structuring a defense to liability, the Butz majority focused on two considerations for establishing a qualified immunity: First, the limits controlling law places on a federal official enforcing a statute; and second, the rationale behind the
section 1983 qualified constitutional tort immunity." 8 In discussing the first consideration, the opinion distinguished several decisions, notably Spalding" and Barr,2 0 by finding that
114. 438 U.S. at 482-83.
115. Id. at 483.
116. Relying on Barr and Spalding, the government had contended that all of
the defendant officials were absolutely immune from any damages liability. This was
allegedly so "even if in the course of enforcing the relevant statutes they infringed
[Economou's] constitutional rights and even if the violation was knowing and deliberate." Id. at 485.
117. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.
1976).
118. It is interesting to note that the majority employed cases refusing to impose liability in order to establish that absolute immunity never existed, stating that
the law of privilege has "in large part been of judicial making." 438 U.S. at 501-02
(citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 569).
119. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 51-65 supra.
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did not immunize conduct that ignored or erroneously applied
constitutional or statutory limitations on authority.2" For an
official to make out his defense, he must show that his authority was sufficient in law to protect him. Applying the rationale
advanced in Ex parte Young, 1 22 there can be no absolute immunity defense for a constitutional tort since an unconstitu123
tional act can never be authorized by law or statute.
The majority then addressed the second consideration:
the purposes of the section 1983 qualified immunity.' 24 Here
the Court put to rest any lingering distinctions in liability for
constitutional torts between state executive officials and officers at the federal level. Both types of claims serve the same
function in protecting citizens from violations of their constitutional rights by government officials.
After deciding that a qualified immunity was appropriate,
the Court then considered whether the level of immunity
would be dependent upon the official's position in the federal
hierarchy. The broad range of discretion exercised by these
executives and the public interest in the vigorous discharge of
official responsibilities must be balanced against the necessity
of providing redress for citizens whose constitutional rights
have been violated. In Butz, the majority drew heavily upon
121. 438 U.S. at 489.
122. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
123. In his dissent to the qualified immunity Butz established for executive officials, Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Stevens. The dissent suggested two "evils" were let loose by permitting a civil damages action against federal officials. The first "evil" would be an "impairment of the
ability of responsible public officials to carry out the duties imposed upon them by
law." 438 U.S. at 530. The second "evil" is that the future of qualified immunity in
the courts will result in "a necessarily unprincipled and erratic judicial 'screening' of
claims . . . and adherence to the form of the law while departing from its substance."
Id.
The difficulty with the approach advanced by the dissent is its overconcern with
the degree to which an active court is likely to increase the drain on the public treasury and curb executive enthusiasm. See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability:
A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463, 531-32 (1963). As long as government can anticipate liability with some certainty and make financial preparations
through insurance systems of budgetary allotments, the courts will not be required to
choose between compensating injured parties and protecting governmental activity
from debilitating impairment as though these were mutually exclusive goals. By using
an official's job scheme within a bureaucratic system to insulate his actions from constitutional review, the dissent is turning its back on permitting the courts to develop
standards within their traditional role of adjudicating rights when these rights are
brought into question.
124. See text accompanying notes 19-50 supra.
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the rationale suggested by the section 1983 decisions: "In situations of abuse, an action for damages against the responsible
official can be an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees."'12 5 In so balancing, the Court held federal
executive officials to an immunity of subjective good faith and
objective reasonable grounds. Particularly important, the
Court "insisted on an awareness of clearly established constitutional limits" in the official's action or decision. 2 ' Notably,
this was the same defense employed in Wood v. Strickland for
evaluating objective reasonableness of the agent's conduct. 2 '
If an official desires absolute immunity from constitutional torts, the Butz decision does permit him to demon28
strate that public policy requires this complete exemption.
The ability of federal courts to determine the appropriate
level of executive immunity should be guided by the presence
of congressional authorization for suit. Absent congressional
action, the court should first determine if the plaintiff is entitled to a damage remedy; second, decide if the court itself is
qualified to handle the claim; and finally, balance considerations of public policy in protecting the allegedly responsible
official's ability to make and implement decisions with the interest of the harmed individual in being compensated. 29 In
performing this last step, the court should recognize "that it is
not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should know
he is acting outside the law . . ."130
The important points of that aspect of the Court's decision structuring a damage remedy are diminished by what is
left out. Are participating supervisory personnel liable for unconstitutional action? Does the failure of such personnel to
prevent institutional disregard for the rights of individuals allow a cause of action? If supervisory personnel fail to apprise
subordinates of the unconstitutionality of a statute of regulation, does an action against the supervisor arise if the unconstitutional legislation is enforced? Are government units liable
when the official causing the constitutional violation was
grossly negligent and cannot be identified? While these ques125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

438 U.S. at 506.
Id. at 506-07.
See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
438 U.S. at 506.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 506.
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tions will be dealt with in the final section of this comment, a
significant corollary question was asked and answered by the
Butz decision: In this balancing process, does the policy of deterring unconstitutional official action weigh as heavily as the
goal of minimizing judicial interference?
An Absolute Immunity
While holding that a qualified immunity should be the
rule, in Butz the Court found that some of the defendants
performed special functions requiring absolute immunity.
Here a unanimous court reasoned that "[t]he cluster of immunities protecting the various participants in judge-supervised
trials stems from the characteristics of the judicial process
rather than its location.""1 1 Thus, an agency adjudication
shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process, including its adversarial nature and many of the same procedural safeguards, so that those officials participating in the process should be immune from damage suits. Executive officials
then, who take part in agency adjudications as judges, advocates, and witnesses are afforded a full exemption from liability in order to function "without harassment and intimidation." 31 2 These officials include federal hearing examiners,
administrative law judges, those officials responsible for the
decision to initiate or continue an administrative proceeding,
and those agency attorneys arranging for the presentation of
administrative evidence.13 3 The Court felt that the risk of an
unconstitutional act was outweighed by the importance of
preserving the official's independent judgment and that the
defendant had sufficient remedies in such a hearing to serve
as "checks on agency zeal." ' 4
This allowance of absolute immunity is an ineffective deterrent to unconstitutional conduct by federal officers. Resolving the immunity question in this fashion bases liability upon
the functions and responsibilities of the defendant rather than
the purposes of the constitutional tort action. Ignoring the
131. Id. at 512. This part of the court's decision was based on: Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927); Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). See generally Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 463 (1909).
132. 438 U.S. at 512.
133. Id. at 513-17.
134. Id. at 516.
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misuse of power by those clothed with quasi-judicial authority
establishes a nearly insurmountable barrier to the recovery of
damages in actions like Butz. The reasonableness of any executive's belief in the constitutionality of his action should play
a role in determining the extent of his liability.
Administrative tribunals are not courts. Officers engaged
in these proceedings frequently promulgate the policies they
later enforce. Because recognition of an immunity necessarily
undercuts one of the central purposes of the constitutional
tort action, compensation to victims, those seeking to obtain
immunity should have the burden of establishing why this
purpose should be disregarded. By placing the office above the
Constitution because of a stated policy of fairness to the official, the Butz Court allows a greater unfairness since damages
are denied to the victim of the constitutional deprivation.
THE SEARCH FOR A STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

As the history of executive liability and the recent decision in Butz point out, the counterproductive nature of executive immunity from constitutional torts can be cured if courts
will recognize their inherent capacity for deciding constitutional disputes. This involves devoloping justiciable good
faith-reasonable grounds standards by weighing the interests
involved within the fact-law pattern of a given case before the
court. The range of interests includes those of the litigants,
the public, and the executive branch.
Fairness to the injured party, while a primary goal, cannot be achieved in a vacuum. In analyzing the true nature of
the constitutional deprivation, there must be conscious effort
to isolate the precise right that has been injured.13 5 The public
interest is paradoxical precisely because it is difficult to strike
the appropriate balance between the individual and the state
when the costs to one meet head-on with the goals of the
other.
What are the effects on the executive official who must
answer for constitutional deprivations? The harm resulting
from such conduct is often more easily avoided than the harm
caused by simple negligence, so if the threat of personal liabil135. "A moderately canny pleader ... [will] be able, in framing the issues, to
describe much allegedly tortious official conduct in constitutional terms." W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 353 (6th ed. 1974).
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ity serves some deterrent purpose, its imposition would seem
particularly useful expecially where constitutional violations
are concerned. Even if such conduct cannot readily be eliminated, it does not follow that the public should have to pay
for its consequences.
The sections below will analyze three important considerations for a case-by-case development of constitutional tort
standards: 1) Is the imposition of liability based upon a theory
of compensation or deterrence? 2) Who will ultimately pay for
the liability? 3) Should the next step be to attempt to attach
liability to the "negligent" governmental organization?
Compensation or Deterrence
Consideration must be given to the compensatory concerns of the constitutional tort. These concerns are best examined in light of one stated purpose of section 1983. "[T]he
basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.
...
136 Damages are available for actions
found "to have been violative of. . .constitutional rights and
,,137
to have caused compensable injury. ....
A study of lower federal court decisions demonstrates the
application of this compensatory purpose.1 38 For example, the
decision in Carey v. Piphus held that "in order to further the

purpose of § 1983, the rules governing compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should
be tailored to the interests protected by the particular
right. .... ,,139 Moreover, that decision pointed out that the
136. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978)(students suspended from school
without procedural due process only entitled to recover nominal damages against
school officials absent proof of actual injury).
137. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added); see Codd v. Velger,
429 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823 (3rd Cir.
1976); United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir. 1975); Magnet
v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1973); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
1970).
For discussions of the problems of fashioning damage awards under section 1983,
see generally McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial
Enforcement of ConstitutionalProtections, (pt. 1), 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 55-66 (1974);
Yudof, Liability for ConstitutionalTorts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official,
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1322, 1366-83 (1976); Comment, Civil Actions for Damages Under
the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEx. L. REV. 1015, 1023-35 (1967).
139. 435 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

"elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages ...
caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right are not
necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the
deprivation of another."' 4
Compensation should be contrasted with the true deterrent effect of the good faith-reasonable grounds requirement.
Executive officials will be forced to make a stronger preliminary showing that their activities were within the scope of
their duties and were of a quality to justify immunization
from suit. As the decisions supporting executive immunity
make clear, the import of the doctrine is to immunize the official not from liability as much as from the necessity of defending his action in court. The threshold questions as to the
availability of the immunity defense are often unanswerable
without a full evidentiary hearing. The courts will require, at
a minimum, affidavits properly setting forth the defendant's
reasons for making the decision to act.
The deterrent impact of a constitutional tort judgment
can be limited. First, because it only affects constitutional violations, the tort action offers no specific deterrence against the
official when the individual's rights do not rise to constitutional dimensions. Second, an action in constitutional tort can
deter only to the extent that clear rules for future conduct are
formulated. Officials have often criticized the courts for lack
of clarity and direction in constitutional decisions.14 ' Third,
the vindication of constitutional rights presently fails to take
into account the organizational context of executive actions by
not addressing isolated individual conduct rather than department-wide policy. An official cannot be expected to respect
constitutional rights if his agency encourages violations.
To fully appraise the deterrent effect of tort liability, the
court should also take into consideration the effect on governmental entry into socially desirable areas of activity. The continuous threat of exposure to damages could dampen an official's enthusiasm in the performance of his duty.' 42 With the
section 1983 decisions requiring that, in addition to an official's subjective good faith, a reasonable basis for the official's
140. Id. at 264-65.
141. Members of the Supreme
informed prophecy as to what are
Strickland, 420 U.S. at 324 (Powell,
142. Green v. James, 473 F.2d

Court have also recognized "the hazard of even
'unquestioned constitutional rights.' " Wood v.
J., dissenting).
660 (9th Cir. 1973).
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conduct must exist, liability attaches whether the resulting
consequences are a physical invasion of the individual's person or an intangible infringement of a procedural right.
A useful discussion of the compensation-deterrence balance is found in the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in
Bivens. 14 3 He looked to the federal court's "inherent equitable
powers" to relieve violations of the Constitution. 144 It is then
only necessary that there be a federally protected interest:
"[I]t must also be recognized that the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interest of the individual in
the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities ....
",145 Because the general federal question jurisdiction
allowed a federal court to grant equitable relief in any case
within that jurisdiction, Justice Harlan concluded that the
same jurisdictional statute should suffice to permit a federal
court to utilize traditional legal remedies. In assessing the appropriateness of affording Bivens compensatory relief, Justice
Harlan noted that the decision did not depend solely on the
deterrent effect of imposing liability, but might instead be
based either on the need for compensation or the "nature of
the personal interest asserted."14 6 Thus, to Justice Harlan, it
seemed that neither the source of the right (the Constitution)
nor the nature of the remedy (damages) would require that
the judiciary await legislative authorization before effectuat147
ing the remedy necessary to vindicate the right.
By making the governmental entity vicariously liable for
the negligence of its officials, the public equivalent of respondeat superior, but denying the right of indemnification
against the official for his negligence, the decision to allow liability could then depend upon the likelihood that the behavior in question is deterrable. To resolve the damages issue, the
core purpose of constitutional tort needs clarification. If that
143. 403 U.S. at 398. Harlan viewed Bivens as broadly applicable:
I am of the opinion that federal courts do have the power to award damages for violation of "constitutionally protected interests" and . . . that
a traditional judicial remedy such as damages is appropriate to the vindication of the personal interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 404 (Harlan, J., concurring)(quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957)(Burton, J., concurring in result)).
145. 403 U.S. at 407.
146. Id. at 409 n.10.
147. See Dellinger, supra note 45, at 1543.
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purpose is compensatory, little justification exists in forcing
the plaintiff to seek redress from an individual defendant who
is likely to have a shallow pocket. Having granted the
tortfeasor a scope of employment including discretionary authority, there is no logical impediment to holding the government ultimately liable for the officer's acts, especially when
the alternative is to leave the harm uncompensated. If its purpose is to recognize deterrence, constitutional liability may
provide an incentive for employers to clarify and restrict the
boundaries in which discretion might be exercised. Thorough
supervision, carefully delineated organizational policy, and
even selective employment habits may result from the possibility of deterrent liability.1 4 s "When [a constitutional right] is
denied, the victim is entitled to compensation and the public
is entitled to the deterrent effect ... .
Allocation of Liability
In situations in which both .the government and the individual official are sued for torts committed by the official
while acting within the scope of his authority, the problem remains of deciding whether and to what extent apportionment
of damages or contribution is appropriate. 150 Even though his
conduct resulted in a constitutional deprivation, the official
148. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), plaintiffs, representing a class of
Philadelphia citizens, brought an equitable action under section 1983, alleging that
Philadelphia police systematically mistreated minority citizens. The district court ordered the police department to improve the system for citizens' complaints and to set
regulations for police-citizen encounters. The Supreme Court overturned the decision,
noting that the defendants were high-level city officials, not the police officers who
had allegedly deprived minorities of their constitutional rights. As these petitioners
were only nominally in charge of the police department, there was no showing that
petitioners approved or knew of the misconduct of the individual officers. Also, respondents lacked standing to sue because they did not show that refusing to grant
equitable relief would have resulted in continuing harm to the respondents themselves. Id. at 371.
Applying Rizzo to constitutional tort actions, the decision might be construed as
a bar to injunctive relief attempting to deter continuation of allegedly unconstitutional conduct by a federal organization. Rizzo could easily be distinguished where
the unconstitutional conduct sought to be enjoined was sanctioned by state law. See
Tucker v. City of Montgomery, 410 F. Supp. 494, 508 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
149. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section
1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 461 (1978).
150. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) (a joint
tortfeasor may sue the United States for contribution under the Federal Tort Claims
Act); 1 & 2 I. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 10.1, 10.2, 20.3 (1956).
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may have acted in whole or in part beyond the scope of his
authority, and to that extent he should be exclusively liable.
Matters become more complex when the government is
directly rather than vicariously liable, as in the instances
where it breaches an independent duty to supervise officials or
where the deprivation complained of is basically systemic in
character. Pragmatically, the cost of unconstitutional conduct
of this nature should be spread among the taxpayers, who
reap the benefits of government and are ultimately responsible for it. This is particularly true when the responsibility for
the deprivation is disbursed among various governmental departments rather than focused in the officer who operates
most directly on the plaintiff.
The Federal Tort Claims Act does not permit either the
negligent official 151 or the United States" 2 a right to indemnify against the other. This may create difficulty for a defendant when recovery in certain constitutional tort cases is more
reflective of the jury's judgment thatfuture violations need to
be deterred, rather than recognition of the gravity of the
plaintiff's injury.
While the United States Department of Justice will offer
a federal official the free services of its attorneys for legal defense, provided he was acting within the scope of his authority
at the time the injury occurred, 1 53 the Department has taken
the view that paying certain tort judgments of federal officials
might be an unauthorized expenditure of public funds.15 1 Yet,
the federal government will be "independently liable" whenever a federal law enforcement agent injured the public "while
151. Uptagrafft v. United States, 315 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 818 (1963).
152. United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
153. See 42 Fed. Reg. 5695-96 (1977). The legal basis for this policy statement
is a statute reserving to the Justice Department authority over "the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or official thereof is a party, or is interested .... " 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970).
154. See Supplemental Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1977: Hearings on H.R.
4877 Before Senate Subcomm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 861 (1977).
See also Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 920
(1977)(military doctors have absolute immunity from medical malpractice suit due to
their modest incomes and their lack of indemnification from the government).
In an action under section 1983, "the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976), as amended by Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641.
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acting within the scope of his employment or under color of
Federal law." 155
The definition of a right of action against an official
turns, in important part, on the degree to which it can be pursued. Some alternatives to constitutional tort liability include
a system of administrative discipline; 5 ' "oversight-by the
press, by Congress, the public, and by internal agency personnel";"5 7 or isolation, for separate treatment, of the issues related to deterrence and compensation." 8 The difficulty with
these suggestions is that the citizenry has as much interest in
preventing constitutional misconduct as in compensating
those injured. No system should be adopted simply because it
is an expedient means of compensating the victims of government-inflicted harm. Society has a right to insist that when
officials commit constitutional violations they do so at their
own risk.
The "Negligent" Governmental Organization
A characteristic of bureaucracy is its hierarchical structure of authority. This structure, coupled with the organization's rules and regulations, is designed to allow specialization,
coordination, and control within the unit.'5 9 The effect is to
reduce the significance of the individual and enhance the importance of the organization. 60 This characteristic suggests
that, because an organization may exert considerable control
over the conduct of those affiliated with it, the organization
should be seen as a responsible entity in its own right.6
155. S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., lst Sess. 3-4 (1973).
156. R. VAUGHN, THE SPOILED SYSTEM 154, 162 (1975). Federal law authorizes
disciplinary action against federal employees "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a)(1976). Sanctions available at the federal
level include removal, suspension, leave without pay and reduction in rank or pay. 5
U.S.C. § 7511(2)(1976).
157. Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566
F.2d 289, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(en banc)(Wilkey, J., concurring).
158. See generally Foote, supra note 58, at 514-15.
159. See P. BLAU & W.R. SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 32, 63 (1962).
160. M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 217-18 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).
161. See Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional
Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONS.
L.Q. 531, 575 (1977). Recently, the Supreme Court in Monell v. Dep't of Social ServE.,
438 U.S. 658 (1978) partially overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and held
that local governments are not wholly immune from suit under section 1983. Justice
Brennan, in his majority opinion, stated that the immunity formerly enjoyed by a

1980)

EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY'

487

Federal organizations may be causally connected to a
deprivation of constitutional rights. This connection need not
take the form of direct participation or overt orders; more
likely, officials merely tolerate misconduct in the ranks. 162 To
hold such an organization liable for negligence would require a
plaintiff to show a duty to act, a breach of that duty, and a
causal connection between the breach and the plaintiff's injury. 163 Ascertaining a duty may be difficult when the superior
is shown to have no knowledge of misconduct by subordinates.164 Proof of such knowledge will often be difficult, as will
local government is no longer available when such an entity is sued for alleged unconstitutional action resulting from an implementation or execution of a policy statement, custom ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body's officers. 438 U.S. at 690-91. However, the Court expressly held that a
municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory:
[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of
a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under
§ 1983.
Id. at 694 (emphasis added). Accordingly, in the absence of an alleged constitutional
tort caused by official municipal policy, a municipality is not a "person" within the
meaning of section 1983.
162. Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969), was an action for
injunctive relief arising from alleged police misconduct during the 1968 Democratic
National Convention. The appellate court reversed a dismissal for failure to state a
cause of action stating:
From a legal standpoint, it makes no difference whether the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights are violated as a result of police behavior which is
the product of the active encouragement and direction of their superiors
or as a result of the superiors' mere acquiescence in such behavior. In
either situation, if the police officials had a duty, as they admittedly had
here, to prevent the officers under their direction from committing the
acts which are alleged to have occurred during the Convention, they are
proper defendants in this action.
Id. at 1086.
See Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police
Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143, 147 (1968):
[Dieliberately ordered violations of constitutional rights have not been
the primary problem. Most frequently, unconstitutional searches, arrests, or other abuses of police authority cannot be traced .

. .

. Far

more often, recurring violations are passively tolerated by those responsible for supervising the police department.
163. See generally Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 831 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
164. See Bracey v. Grenoble, 494 F.2d 566, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1974); Wright v.
McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972).

488

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

the requisite link between the superior's breach and the deprivation of rights. 65
The fact that liability is presently personal may allow an
official to disclaim responsibility on the grounds that he had
delegated the injurious task to intermediate officials. Arguably, the superior could be held liable only if the delegation
itself was negligent and could be sufficiently linked to the injury. A reasonable standard of care and responsibility could
allocate liability between the injured party and the government or some related public entity whose benefit is derived
from the activity in question.
CONCLUSION

Immunity cannot be justified by saying that fear of judgments will lead to undue timidity of public officials in carrying
out their responsibilities. Butz clearly exculpates official actions taken in good faith and with reasonable grounds. Furthermore, private corporations have functioned without visible interference with operational success while bearing the
load of substantial potential risk from general tort liability.
There is no logical reason why the federal government, with
equal opportunity to plan for losses and to buy insurance,
could not likewise operate as effectively under conditions of
liability.'66 In fact, the evidence from states in which immunity has been abolished shows the fears of expense to be
unwarranted.

67

Even if the arguments in favor of sovereign immunity
were once valid, the relationship between the citizen and the
government has changed so that immunity is now a dangerous
If the probability of recurrence is sufficient, the problem point becomes whether
the supervisors are in fact in a position within the hierarchy to prevent the
deprivation.
165. See Newman, supra note 149, at 455:
Providing for suit directly against the employing department or unit of
government would accomplish more than simply informing the jury of a
deeper pocket. It would enhance the prospects for deterrence by placing
responsibility for the denial of constitutional rights on the entity with
the capacity to take vigorous action to avoid recurrence.
166. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 259, 111 N.W.2d 1, 24 (1961)
(Black, J., concurring).
167. Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 919, 969-78.
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anachronism. 168 The damage resulting from the unconstitutional act of an official should be distributed amongst the
community of citizens constituting the government, where it
could be borne with less hardship, rather than imposed entirely upon the single individual who suffers the constitutional
injury.
Philip L. Gregory, Jr.

168. See Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative
Study of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New York
Court of Claims, 22 AD. L. REV. 39, 58 (1969):
Sovereign immunity is at best a judicial protective device created to
immunize a weak government against oppressive and insensitive citizen
demands . . . . Today it is the citizen who is helpless in the face of
growing governmental intrusion into his very life, often with unpredictable and tragic results . . . . [Sovereign immunity is] dangerous to our
democratic institutions if allowed to exist untrammelled by controls appropriate to contain it.

